期刊
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
卷 164, 期 -, 页码 19-32出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.04.013
关键词
Retirement; Seniority wages; Firm incentives
类别
资金
- Austrian Science Fund [S 10301-G16, 5103]
- CD-Laboratory Aging, Health and the Labor Market
In general, retirement is seen as a pure labor supply phenomenon, but firms can have strong incentives to send expensive older workers into retirement. Based on considerations about wage costs and replacement costs, we discuss steep seniority wage profiles as incentives for firms to dismiss older workers before retirement. Conditional on individual retirement incentives, e.g., social security wealth accrual rates or health status, the steepness of the wage profile will have different incentives for workers as compared to firms to maintain the employment relationship. Using an instrumental variable approach to account for selection of workers in our firms and for reverse causality, we find that firms with higher labor costs for older workers have on average a lower job exit age and a higher incidence of golden handshakes. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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