期刊
NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS
卷 64, 期 3, 页码 203-216出版社
WILEY
DOI: 10.1002/nav.21745
关键词
rationing game; bullwhip effect; reverse bullwhip effect; supply uncertainty; order variance
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71522009, 71202068, 71632007, 71421002, 71210002, 71332005]
- National Science Foundation [CMMI-0726822, CMMI-1265671]
- Tsinghua-Berkeley Shenzhen Institute
When an unreliable supplier serves multiple retailers, the retailers may compete with each other by inflating their order quantities in order to obtain their desired allocation from the supplier, a behavior known as the rationing game. We introduce capacity information sharing and a capacity reservation mechanism in the rationing game and show that a Nash equilibrium always exists. Moreover, we provide conditions guaranteeing the existence of the reverse bullwhip effect upstream, a consequence of the disruption caused by the supplier. In contrast, we also provide conditions under which the bullwhip effect does not exist. In addition, we show that a smaller unit reservation payment leads to more bullwhip and reverse bullwhip effects, while a large unit underage cost results in a more severe bullwhip effect. (c) 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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