期刊
出版社
ASSOC ADVANCEMENT ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
关键词
-
类别
资金
- FCT-Portugal [SIKH/BD/94736/2013, nix:ATI-SU/5081/2014, PTDC/MAI/STA/3358/2014, UID/BIA/04050/2013, JID/CEC/50021/2013]
Social norms can help solving cooperation dilemmas, constituting a key ingredient in systems of indirect reciprocity (IR). Under IR, agents are associated with different reputations, whose attribution depends on socially adopted norms that judge behaviors as good or bad. While the pros and cons of having a certain public image depend on how agents learn to discriminate between reputations, the mechanisms incentivizing agents to report the outcome of their interactions remain unclear, especially when reporting involves a cost (costly reputation building). Here we develop a new model-inspired in evolutionary game theory-and show that two social norms can sustain high levels of cooperation, even if reputation building is costly. For that, agents must be able to anticipate the reporting intentions of their opponents. Cooperation depends sensitively on both the cost of reporting and the accuracy level of reporting anticipation.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据