期刊
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT
卷 93, 期 -, 页码 101-124出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.11.009
关键词
-
资金
- Australian Research Council [DP120102697]
Diffuse pollution from agriculture and extractive industries reduces air and water quality and contributes to climate change. We consider a setting in which a regulator must incentivize unobserved abatement given that firms have limited liability, and when they can enter and exit. We demonstrate that a simple dynamic incentive scheme can solve this difficult regulatory problem: firms pay a constant tax and receive rebates following periods of low pollution. We apply the model to water pollution from a fracking operation and simulate the contract to explore the volatility of the firm's payments and the costs of limited liability. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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