期刊
MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTERS IN SIMULATION
卷 132, 期 -, 页码 86-99出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.matcom.2016.07.001
关键词
Bertrand competition; Cournot competition; Heterogeneous expectations; Stability; Bifurcation
类别
资金
- Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness [ECO2013-41353-P]
- Government of Aragon
- FEDER [S10/2015, S13/2015]
In a differentiated triopoly model with heterogeneous firms, the local stability of the Nash equilibrium under both quantity and price competition is analyzed. We find that the presence of a firm following a gradient rule based on marginal profits, and a player with adaptive expectations, determines the local stability of the Nash equilibrium, regardless the competition type, while the effects of the degree of product differentiation on the stability depend on the nature of products. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium is more stable under quantity competition than under price competition. (C) 2016 International Association for Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (IMACS). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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