期刊
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
卷 113, 期 -, 页码 223-247出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.011
关键词
Evolution of preferences; Indirect evolutionary approach; Theory of mind; Depth of reasoning; Deception; Efficiency
类别
资金
- European Research Council [677057]
- Handelsbankens forskningsstiftelser [P2016-0079:1]
- Swedish Research Council [2015-01751]
- Swedish Research Council [2015-01751] Funding Source: Swedish Research Council
We develop a framework in which individuals' preferences coevolve with their abilities to deceive others about their preferences and intentions. Specifically, individuals are characterised by (i) a level of cognitive sophistication and (ii) a subjective utility function. Increased cognition is costly, but higher-level individuals have the advantage of being able to deceive lower-level opponents about their preferences and intentions in some of the matches. In the remaining matches, the individuals observe each other's preferences. Our main result shows that, essentially, only efficient outcomes can be stable. Moreover, under additional mild assumptions, we show that an efficient outcome is stable if and only if the gain from unilateral deviation is smaller than the effective cost of deception in the environment. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据