期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
卷 176, 期 5, 页码 1325-1339出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-018-1065-z
关键词
Compatibilism; Contrastive explanations; Free will; Incompatibilism; Indeterminism; The Luck Objection; Moral responsibility
类别
A contrastive explanation explains not only why some event A occurred, but why A occurred as opposed to some alternative event B. Some philosophers argue that agents could only be morally responsible for their choices if those choices have contrastive explanations, since they would otherwise be luck infested. Assuming that contrastive explanations cannot be offered for causally undetermined events, this requirement entails that no one could be held responsible for a causally undetermined choice. Such arguments challenge incompatibilism, since they entail that causal determinism is a prerequisite for moral responsibility. However, I argue that for a significant class of choices, even if we stipulate that they are determined, we will be unable to provide a relevant contrastive explanation. Hence causal determinism is no remedy for luck infestation, and compatibilists do not fare much better than incompatibilists in the face of this requirement. This should serve to weaken its philosophical appeal.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据