4.7 Article

Monopoly Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning

期刊

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
卷 63, 期 11, 页码 3586-3608

出版社

INFORMS
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2526

关键词

social learning; information aggregation; bounded rationality; optimal pricing

资金

  1. NET Institute
  2. Progetti di Ricerca di Interesse Nazionale [20103S5RN3]
  3. Singapore University of Technology and Design-Massachusetts Institute of Technology (SUTD-MIT) International Design Centre [IDG31300110]

向作者/读者索取更多资源

Amonopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences. Although initially uninformed about the product quality, they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers. Our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its effect on the seller's pricing decision. Consumers follow an intuitive, non-Bayesian decision rule. Under conditions that we identify, we show that consumers eventually learn the product's quality. We show how the learning trajectory can be approximated in settings with high demand intensity via a mean-field approximation that highlights the dynamics of this learning process, its dependence on the price, and the market heterogeneity with respect to quality preferences. Two pricing policies are studied: a static price and one with a single price change. Finally, numerical experiments suggest that pricing policies that account for social learning may increase revenues considerably relative to policies that do not.

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.7
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据