期刊
JOURNAL OF WORLD BUSINESS
卷 54, 期 3, 页码 191-212出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
DOI: 10.1016/j.jwb.2019.02.001
关键词
Empire building; Agency hazards; Institutional theory; State-ownership; Innovativeness; Foreign capital
类别
Integrating agency and institutional perspectives, we describe how China's socio-political institutions create state-owned corporate empires with unique agency conflicts. We develop a framework demonstrating how economically unjustified firm expansion, i.e. empire building, mediates the relationship between state ownership and performance. We uncover the instrument in empire building and appropriate corporate governance and strategic management remedies. An empirical study on 29,638 Chinese firms evidences that (1) increased state ownership drives higher management expenses and lower firm profitability though empire building; (2) long-term debt is used to finance empire building; and (3) foreign capital investments and innovativeness can mitigate these agency conflicts.
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