The political economy of oil in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Corruption and regime control

This paper examines in detail dynamics of corruption and regime stabilisation which define the shape of the oil sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This sector is a major source of patronage and rent-extraction. However, much of these rents are not created through production, but through selling access. Most potential fields remain unexplored and undeveloped, which is much more interesting for short-term rent extraction for the concerned actors. Within this, we demonstrate the political and social logics behind corruption. The regime distributes patronage by permitting rent extraction, but this extraction has upper and lower limits: corruption is punished when too visible, and non-participants are side-lined. Further, we note the importance of regime stability logics in the sector, specifically managing internal geopolitics, regional relationships, and central control over major wealth. By exploring in detail the practical realities discussed in general in the 'resource curse' and 'oil curse' literature, this paper provides a deeper understanding of how political control and corruption function within the DRC, and how development becomes their victim.