期刊
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
卷 173, 期 -, 页码 113-124出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.02.001
关键词
privacy; personal data; information externalities; GDPR
类别
资金
- National Research Foundation of Korea - Korean Government [NRF-2016S1A5A2A01022389]
- National Research Foundation of Korea [2016S1A5A2A01022389] Funding Source: Korea Institute of Science & Technology Information (KISTI), National Science & Technology Information Service (NTIS)
We provide a theoretical model of privacy in which data collection requires consumers' consent and consumers are fully aware of the consequences of such consent. Nonetheless, excessive collection of personal information arises in the monopoly market equilibrium which results in excessive loss of privacy compared to the social optimum. The main mechanism for this result is information externalities and users' coordination failure in which some users' decision to share their personal information may allow the data controller to infer more information about non-users. We also show that the emergence of data brokerage industry can facilitate the collection and monetization of users' personal data even in a fragmented market where no individual website has incentives to do so independently due to scale economies in data analytics. We discuss policy implications of our analysis in light of the recent EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据