期刊
IEEE CONTROL SYSTEMS LETTERS
卷 3, 期 4, 页码 1002-1007出版社
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/LCSYS.2019.2919959
关键词
Social networks; resource allocation
资金
- Institut des sciences de l'information et de leurs interactions of Centre national de la recherche scientifique under the 80'PRIME Call
In this letter, we consider a network of consumers who are under the combined influence of their neighbors and external influencing entities (the marketers). The consumers' opinion follows a hybrid dynamics whose opinion jumps are due to the marketing campaigns. By using the relevant static game model proposed in previous works, we prove that although the marketers are in competition and therefore create tension in the network, the network reaches a consensus. Exploiting this key result, we propose a coopetition marketing strategy which combines the one-shot Nash equilibrium actions and a policy of no advertising. Under reasonable sufficient conditions, it is proved that the proposed coopetition strategy profile Pareto-dominates the one-shot Nash equilibrium strategy. This is a very encouraging result to tackle the much more challenging problem of designing Pareto-optimal and equilibrium strategies for the considered dynamical marketing game.
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