期刊
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
卷 129, 期 623, 页码 2888-2915出版社
OXFORD UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez018
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资金
- Key Laboratory of Mathematical Economics and Quantitative Finance (Peking University), Ministry of Education of China
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71603010, 71973002]
Motivated by the prevalence of economic targets at all levels of territory administration in China, this article proposes a Tullock contest model to study optimal target setting in a multi-layered tournament-based organisation. In our model, targets are used by upper-level officials to convey the importance of economic growth and incentivise subordinates in the tournaments. Our model predicts a top-down amplification of economic growth targets along the jurisdiction levels, which explains the observed pattern in China. Using both provincial and prefectural-level data, we test the model predictions and find consistent evidence.
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