Don't Put Words in My Mouth: Self-appointed Speaking-for Is Testimonial Injustice Without Prejudice

In this paper, I will characterize a phenomenon I call 'self-appointed speaking-for', and show how it constitutes a counter-example to Miranda Fricker's definition of testimonial injustice (TI), expanding our understanding of the category. Self-appointed speaking-for occurs when one speaks on behalf of or in place of another individual or group without their authorization. It is the sort of phenomenon that occasions complaints like, 'You put words in my mouth'; that happens when someone else answers a question directed at you; or when someone purports to represent the perspective of a group they are not affiliated with or entitled to represent. I argue that this is a central case of Fricker's testimonial injustice, on the grounds that it inflicts the same harms as other kinds of TI - particularly demeaning someone in their capacity as a giver of knowledge - in a way that is both epistemically and ethically culpable. TI is wrong not only for the harms it generates but also because its cause - prejudice - is ethically wrong and bad epistemic practice. As I show, self-appointed speaking-for is wrong for the same reasons as prejudice is, no matter what motivates it.