期刊
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
卷 135, 期 2, 页码 379-398出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.06.005
关键词
Terrorist attacks; Executive compensation; Compensation structure; CEO labor market; Nonmonetary compensation
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71702061]
- Faculty Research Grant of Hong Kong Baptist University
Using multiple measures of attack proximity, we show that CEOs employed at firms located near terrorist attacks earn an average pay increase of 12% after the attack relative to CEOs at firms located far from attacks. CEOs at terrorist attack-proximate firms prefer cash-based compensation increases (e.g., salary and bonus) over equity-based compensation (e.g., options and stocks granted). The effect is causal and it is larger when the bargaining power of the CEO is high. Other executives and workers do not receive a terrorist attack premium. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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