期刊
JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION
卷 149, 期 -, 页码 1174-1187出版社
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.02.138
关键词
Green supply chain; Governmental intervention; Channel leadership; Fuzzy uncertainties; Game theory
资金
- China National Funds for Distinguished Young Scientists [71425001]
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71371093]
- Innovation Plan of Jiangsu Province University [KYZZ16_0027]
Environmental issues make green manufacturing become inevitable and fuzzy uncertainty prevails in supply chain management. In order to further promote the development of green supply chain, according to channel leadership scenario, we develop three game models of a green supply chain with governmental interventions under fuzzy uncertainties of both manufacturing cost and consumer demand. We study how prices, green levels and expected profits are influenced by channel leadership and governmental interventions. Green level sensitivity and fuzzy degree of parameters are considered. Analytical results indicate that manufacturer Stackelberg scenario is the inferior structure than other scenarios and retailer Stackelberg scenario is superior to other scenarios for all players under the strong governmental interventions. Then, when governmental interventions increase, the green level will increase, but the tendency of retail price depends on channel leadership. Governmental interventions are not always beneficial to the green supply chain and the manufacturer. Further, although the government's subsidy is offered to the manufacturer, the retailer benefits from it ultimately and further becomes the main puller of the development of green products. In addition, a relatively high green level floor for subsidy results in the manufacturer's first-mover disadvantage. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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