期刊
JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION
卷 151, 期 -, 页码 286-302出版社
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.03.011
关键词
Supply chain; Carbon emission capacity; Stackelberg game; Pricing decision
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71332003]
- Humanity and Social Science Youth Foundation of Ministry of Education of China [14YJCZH17]
- Shandong Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China [ZR2016GQ08]
This study considers a two-echelon make-to-order supply chain consisting of one supplier and two retailers under carbon cap regulation. We analyze the pricing decision process in a decentralized system from a game theoretical perspective and find the optimal pricing strategy for the wholesale prices of the supplier and the retail prices of two retailers. Our framework involves various operational strategies, including consistent and inconsistent wholesale prices for the supplier and consistent and inconsistent retail prices for the two retailers. We analyze and compare the performance of strategy combinations and find that the combination of a consistent wholesale price and an inconsistent retail price with a transfer payment mechanism is the best pricing decision to achieve Pareto improvement for supply chain members. We also provide the appropriate range of a carbon cap for the policy maker to effectively reduce carbon emissions. Finally, several numerical examples illustrate the impacts of a carbon cap on profits and carbon emissions in different pricing models. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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