期刊
NEW TECHNOLOGY WORK AND EMPLOYMENT
卷 35, 期 2, 页码 162-177出版社
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/ntwe.12160
关键词
algorithms; calculation; control; management science; dynamic pricing; information asymmetry; on-demand economy; platform labour
资金
- Media, Inequality, Change (MIC) Center at the University of Pennsylvania
- Information Law Institute at New York University
- Media, Inequality, Change (MIC) Center at Rutgers University
On-demand service firms secure market power by cultivating and operationalising calculative asymmetries between the platform and labour. In this article, I analyse dynamic (or 'surge') pricing as an exemplary calculative technique. I show how the asymmetrical application of price-setting allows firms to leverage control at the aggregate level while maintaining the facade of autonomy at the individual level, thereby legitimising workers' classification as independent contractors but solving the coordination problems that the classification introduces. The article complements and extends previous critical research into the platform or 'on-demand' service economy by analysing how management scientists model and simulate on-demand marketplaces. I consider management science to be a calculative technique for optimising operational efficiency. A critical review of management science provides novel insights into platforms' efforts to monopolise calculative agency at the expense of other market participants. The article concludes by considering implications for broader critiques of platform labour management.
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