期刊
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE
卷 112, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.09.013
关键词
Agency problems; Corporate governance; Monitoring; Managerial myopia; Investor horizons; Shareholders; Stakeholders; Corporate social responsibility; Investment; Intangibles; Valuation; Profitability; Volatility; Return; Risk
资金
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
We study the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on shareholder value. We argue that long-term investors can ensure that managers choose the amount of CSR that maximizes shareholder value. We find that long-term investors do increase the value to shareholders of CSR activities, not through higher cash flow but rather through lower cash flow risk. Following prior work, we use indexing by investors and state laws on stakeholder orientation for identification. Our findings suggest that CSR activities can create shareholder value as long as managers are properly monitored by long-term investors. (C) 2017 Published by Elsevier B.V.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据