期刊
JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS
卷 115, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2019.103225
关键词
Decentralization; Fiscal incentives; Local tax enforcement; China
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71773128, 71673279, 71533006, 71403276]
- National Social Science Foundation of China [17ZDA048]
- Fok Ying Tung Education Foundation [151085]
China recently initiated a major decentralization reform to simultaneously improve tax autonomy and fiscal transfers to county governments. We use an instrumented difference-in-differences method and a county-level panel dataset for 1995-2014 to examine the incentive effects of this reform. We find that the reform significantly reduced local tax enforcement (i.e., the degree to which county governments collect legally mandated tax obligations from companies and households); moreover, this result appears to be driven by the opposing incentive effects of increased local tax autonomy and fiscal transfers. In particular, while the reform motivated county governments to improve tax enforcement by enhancing local tax autonomy, it dampened local tax enforcement because of increased fiscal transfers. Our findings provide support to the argument in the decentralization literature that improving local tax autonomy is a more effective way than increasing fiscal transfers to finance local governments while strengthening local fiscal discipline.
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