期刊
PHYSICAL REVIEW E
卷 101, 期 6, 页码 -出版社
AMER PHYSICAL SOC
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.101.062419
关键词
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资金
- National Key Research and Development Program of China [2018AAA0100202]
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [61673110, 61703082, 61903080]
- Major Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China [71790614]
- Fund for Innovative Research Groups of the National Natural Science Foundation of China [71621061]
- Major International Joint Research Project of the National Natural Science Foundation of China [71520107004]
- 111 Project [B16009]
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [N2004004]
Punishment has been considered as an effective mechanism for promoting and sustaining cooperation. In most existing models, punishment always comes as a third strategy alongside cooperation and defection, and it is commonly assumed to be executed based on individual decision rules rather than collective decision rules. Differently from previous works, we employ a democratic procedure by which cooperators cast votes independently and simultaneously for whether to impose punishment on defectors, and we establish a relationship between the cooperators' willingness to punish defectors (WTPD) and whether the punishment is inflicted on defectors. The results illustrate that the population can evolve to full cooperation under consensual punishment. It is noteworthy that, compared with autonomous punishment, whether consensual punishment is more in favor of cooperation crucially depends on the minimum number of votes required for punishment execution as well as the cooperators' WTPD. Our findings highlight the importance of collective decision making in the evolution of cooperation and may provide a mathematical framework for explaining the prevalence of democracy in modern societies.
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