4.7 Article

Incentive-Aware Time-Sensitive Data Collection in Mobile Opportunistic Crowdsensing

期刊

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY
卷 66, 期 9, 页码 7849-7861

出版社

IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TVT.2017.2692755

关键词

Incentive-aware mechanism; mobile crowdsensing; Nash bargaining solution (NBS); time-sensitive utility

资金

  1. National Natural Science Foundation of China [61225015, 61105092, 61572347, 61422102]
  2. Beijing Natural Science Foundation [4161001]
  3. Foundation for Innovative Research Groups of the National Natural Science Foundation of China [61321002]

向作者/读者索取更多资源

Data collection is a crucial operation in mobile opportunistic crowdsensing. The design of data collection is challenging due to the fact that smart devices have limited resources to conduct complex computation and sensing tasks in mobile opportunistic networks. In this paper, we propose a time-sensitive incentive-aware mechanism for mobile opportunistic crowdsensing data collection, in which each sensing data has an attached time-sensitive value that decays over time. We focus on the cooperative data collection problem in mobile opportunistic crowdsensing, where data collectors cooperate with mobile users to send data back to requesters. However, due to the selfishness of mobile users, we use an incentive mechanism to stimulate the mobile users to participate in the data collection. The objective is to maximize data collectors' and mobile relay users' rewards. We formulate the interaction among data carrier and mobile relay users as a two-user cooperative game, we apply the asymmetric Nash bargain solution to obtain the optimal cooperation decision and transfer payment. Extensive simulation results based on the real-world traces are provided to validate the superiority of our proposed schemes.

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