4.7 Article

CEO Greed, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Organizational Resilience to Systemic Shocks

期刊

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT
卷 47, 期 4, 页码 957-992

出版社

SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC
DOI: 10.1177/0149206320902528

关键词

corporate social responsibility; top management teams; upper echelon; executive compensation; event history analysis; research methods; panel and repeated-measure designs

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This study examines how CEO greed affects the investment in CSR and organizational outcomes, suggesting that during the GFC, greedy CEOs lead to lower CSR investment and greater losses, resulting in longer recovery time.
In this study, we explore how top executives affect the well-being of multiple stakeholders and long-run organizational outcomes. In the context of the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC), we examine how CEO greed impacts firms' stance toward corporate social responsibility (CSR) prior to the onset of the GFC and how this, in turn, shapes firms' fate during and after the GFC. We argue that CEO greed will be negatively associated with CSR, because in their unbridled pursuit of personal wealth, greedy CEOs are more likely to exhibit myopic behaviors and neglect investment in CSR. We also adopt a person-pay interactionist logic to theorize that the willingness of greedy executives to invest in CSR will be especially sensitive to different types of pay instruments. Next, we build on recent findings from research on CSR that suggest that stakeholder engagement is a defining feature of resilient organizations. We expect that, due to low CSR investment, firms led by greedy CEOs will experience greater losses in the short run and will take longer time to recover from the 2008 GFC. For a sample of 301 CEOs of public U.S. organizations, we analyzed the stock prices and found general support for our hypotheses.

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