期刊
CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY REVIEW
卷 54, 期 2, 页码 183-199出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11007-020-09510-z
关键词
Phenomenological psychology; Social cognition; Infant development; Pairing; Direct social perception
类别
资金
- University of Vienna
The relationship between phenomenology and developmental psychology is explored through an in-depth analysis of a specific problem in social cognition. The paper discusses how cognitive psychology and developmental phenomenology can benefit each other, as well as the implications of nativism in contemporary science. It also considers how phenomenology can contribute to developmental science by proposing viable accounts for accessing other minds and generating empirical knowledge.
We explore relationships between phenomenology and developmental psychology through an in-depth analysis of a particular problem in social cognition: the most fundamental access to other minds. In the first part of the paper, we examine how developmental science can benefit phenomenology. We explicate the connection between cognitive psychology and developmental phenomenology as a form of constructive phenomenological psychology. Nativism in contemporary science constitutes a strong impulse to conceive of the possibility of an innate ability to perceive others' mental states, an idea which also has a transcendental implication. In the second part, we consider how phenomenology can contribute to developmental science. Phenomenology can go beyond the necessary evaluation and reinterpretation of experimental results. Some phenomenological notions and theories can be put forward on a par with alternative cognitive-psychological models and compete with them on grounds of empirical adequacy. For example, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty's notion of pairing can constitute a viable account of how infants access other minds. We outline a number of ways in which this account can be tested and can thus contribute to generating empirical knowledge.
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