期刊
GROWTH AND CHANGE
卷 52, 期 1, 页码 332-348出版社
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/grow.12454
关键词
-
资金
- Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences, Chinese Ministry of Education [16XJC790001]
This study reveals a trend of intensified corporate income tax enforcement in Chinese provinces over time, as well as the impact of strict enforcement in neighboring provinces on surrounding provinces. Tax enforcement interactions involve both state and local tax authorities, shedding light on the regionally decentralized authoritarian system in China and the role of institutional incentives in shaping intergovernmental fiscal relations, in line with second-generation fiscal federalism.
Spatial interactions in tax policy have been examined intensively for developed countries. This study presents new evidence of tax enforcement interactions from a developing country. A trend of intensified enforcement on the corporate income tax (CIT) over time is identified among Chinese provinces. Additionally, stringent CIT enforcement in neighboring provinces enhances CIT enforcement in the surrounded province. Furthermore, tax enforcement interactions involve both the state and local tax authorities. The findings not only help to understand the Chinese regionally decentralized authoritarian system, but also echo second-generation fiscal federalism that highlights the role of institutional incentives in shaping intergovernmental fiscal relations.
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