期刊
SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
卷 87, 期 3, 页码 1010-1030出版社
WILEY
DOI: 10.1002/soej.12478
关键词
entry deterrence; pooling equilibrium; separating equilibrium; signaling game; undefeated equilibrium
类别
资金
- University of Malaga
This article presents a two-period model where a firm operates in both a monopoly and a duopoly market, using private information to limit competition and increase average prices in both markets.
In this article, we present a two-period model in which one firm operates in two markets: a monopoly and a duopoly. Assuming that this firm has private information on the cross-price elasticity of demand between the products sold in both markets, it limits its quantity supplied in the monopoly market in order to make its rival in the other market believe that entry into the monopolized market is unprofitable. As a result of this strategy, the average prices observed in both markets increase. This result suggests that the detrimental effects of entry deterrence on consumers' welfare are stronger than those predicted by previous literature.
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