Policy feedback and lock -in effects of new agricultural policy instruments: A qualitative comparative analysis of support for financial risk management tools in OECD countries

Support for financial risk management tools (SFFRMT) has become part of many agricultural policy portfolios in response to new risks or to replace traditional income support. This paper analyses under which conditions various policy feedback mechanisms can lead to lock-in effects of SFFRMT. A conceptual analysis identifies potential resource, incentive and interpretive effects of SFFRMT likely to create positive policy feedback. A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of 25 cases of SFFRMT in the agricultural sector in OECD countries tested four conditions for lock-in effects: time, investment in SFFRMT, availability of alternatives (direct pay-ments) and inclusion of private intermediary actors. The analysis finds no single condition sufficient for either weak or strong lock-in effects, and time as the only necessary condition for strong lock-in effects. A combination of time and lack of alternatives, or high budgets for SFFRMT and absence of private intermediaries, were suf-ficient to explain strong lock-in effects. Weak lock-in effects are explained by low budgets for SFFRMT in combination with either recency or strong alternatives, or strong alternatives combined with strong in-termediaries. The counterintuitive effects of private intermediaries are explained by their links with the agri-cultural policy community in some cases and the role of well-funded public agencies in others.

Automated summary

This paper analyzes the potential lock-in effects of various policy feedback mechanisms in supporting financial risk management tools, with a focus on the agricultural sector in OECD countries. The study found that time is the only necessary condition for strong lock-in effects, with a combination of time and lack of alternatives or high budgets and absence of private intermediaries explaining strong lock-in effects. Weak lock-in effects are explained by low budgets in combination with recency or strong alternatives, or strong alternatives combined with strong intermediaries.