3.8 Article

The World Just Is the Way It Is

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MONIST
卷 104, 期 1, 页码 1-27

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OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC
DOI: 10.1093/monist/onaa023

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The relationship between objects and properties is viewed in two ways: primitive individuals instantiating properties and objects being bundles of properties. This paper aims to formulate a view that addresses the problems of both perspectives. Ultimately, the view proposed here leads to a radical version of Monism that eliminates the distinction between objects and properties.
What is the relationship between objects and properties? According to a standard view, there are primitive individuals (or 'particulars', or 'substrata') that 'instantiate' or 'have' various properties. According to a rival view, objects are mere 'bundles' of properties. While there are a number of reasons to be skeptical of primitive individuals, there are also a number of challenges that the bundle theorist faces. The goal of this paper is to formulate a view about the relationship between objects and properties that avoids many of the problems inherent in both of these views. The view I will end up defending implies a particularly radical version of Monism, and it collapses the object-property distinction altogether.

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