Conceptualizing consciousness

One of the most promising theories of consciousness currently available is higher-order thought (HOT) theory, according to which consciousness consists in having suitable HOTs regarding one's mental life. But critiques of HOT theory abound. Here, we explore three recent objections to the theory, which we argue at bottom founder for the same reason. While many theorists today assume that consciousness is a feature of the actually existing mental states in virtue of which one has experiences, this assumption is in tension with the underlying motivations for HOT theory and arguably false. We urge that these objections, though sophisticated, trade on this questionable conception of consciousness, thereby begging the question against HOT theory. We then explain how HOT theory might instead understand consciousness.

Automated summary

The higher-order thought (HOT) theory posits that consciousness consists in having suitable HOTs regarding one's mental life, but it faces numerous critiques. These critiques are largely based on differing understandings of the concept of consciousness, raising doubts about the validity of the HOT theory. As a result, there is controversy over how HOT theory should understand consciousness.