4.3 Article

Essentialist Biases Toward Psychiatric Disorders: Brain Disorders Are Presumed Innate

期刊

COGNITIVE SCIENCE
卷 45, 期 4, 页码 -

出版社

WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12970

关键词

Core knowledge; Dualism; Essentialism; Innateness; Intuitive psychology; Mental disorders; Psychiatric disorders; The seductive allure of neuroscience

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Research shows that people are more likely to essentialize psychiatric conditions when they are associated with the brain, believing that these disorders are innate and immutable. This bias suggests that people consider the biological essence of living things as materially embodied.
A large campaign has sought to destigmatize psychiatric disorders by disseminating the view that they are in fact brain disorders. But when psychiatric disorders are associated with neurobiological correlates, laypeople's attitudes toward patients are harsher, and the prognoses seem poorer. Here, we ask whether these misconceptions could result from the essentialist presumption that brain disorders are innate. To this end, we invited laypeople to reason about psychiatric disorders that are diagnosed by either a brain or a behavioral test that were strictly matched for their informative value. Participants viewed disorders as more likely to be innate and immutable when the diagnosis was supported by a brain test as compared to a behavioral test. These results show for the first time that people spontaneously essentialize psychiatric conditions that are linked to the brain, even when the brain probe offers no additional diagnostic or genetic information. This bias suggests that people consider the biological essence of living things as materially embodied.

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