期刊
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
卷 7, 期 3, 页码 329-347出版社
CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1017/apa.2020.29
关键词
implicit bias; mental imagery; propositions; associations
类别
资金
- European Research Council Consolidator grant [72625I]
- Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Odysseus grant [G.0020.I2N]
- Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek research grant [G0C74I6N, G0E02I8N]
The mental representation responsible for implicit bias is argued to be mental imagery, a form of perceptual processing not directly triggered by sensory input, rather than propositional attitudes or simple associations. This view is said to combine the advantages of the two standard accounts of implicit bias while avoiding their disadvantages, and it also explains why manipulating mental imagery is one of the most efficient ways to counteract implicit bias.
What is the mental representation that is responsible for implicit bias? What is this representation that mediates between the trigger and the biased behavior? My claim is that this representation is neither a propositional attitude nor a mere association (as the two major accounts of implicit bias claim). Rather, it is mental imagery: perceptual processing that is not directly triggered by sensory input. I argue that this view captures the advantages of the two standard accounts without inheriting their disadvantages. Further, this view also explains why manipulating mental imagery is among the most efficient ways of counteracting implicit bias.
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