Putting explanation back into inference to the best explanation

Many philosophers argue that explanatoriness plays no special role in confirmation - that inference to the best explanation (IBE) incorrectly demands giving hypotheses extra credit for their potential explanatory qualities beyond the credit they already deserve for their predictive successes. This paper argues against one common strategy for responding to this thought - that is, for trying to fit IBE within a Bayesian framework. That strategy argues that a hypothesis' explanatory quality (its loveliness) contributes either to its prior probability or to its likelihood. This paper argues that this strategy fails because it must give different treatments to two hypotheses that are unlovely for the very same reason. The strategy therefore loses the insight into scientific reasoning that its reconstruction in terms of IBE is supposed to provide. The paper then provides a Bayesian account of the confirmatory role of explanatoriness that represents explanatory quality as having an impact in the same place for two hypotheses that are unlovely for the very same reason. This approach works by putting explanation back into IBE - that is, by invoking hypotheses that refer explicitly to scientific explanation and by invoking the agent's background opinions regarding the kind of explanation that the evidence is liable to have. On this approach, there is no list of explanatory virtues the possession of which always helps to make an explanation better. Rather, for different facts, there are different characteristics that our background knowledge of other explanations gives us some reason to expect the given fact's explanation to possess.

Automated summary

Many philosophers argue that explanatoriness has no special role in confirmation. This paper critiques the strategy of fitting inference to the best explanation (IBE) within a Bayesian framework and proposes a Bayesian account that incorporates explanatory quality into IBE.