Single-Leader-Multiple-Followers Stackelberg Security Game With Hypergame Framework

In this paper, we employ a hypergame framework to analyze the single-leader-multiple-followers (SLMF) Stackelberg security game with two typical misinformed situations: misperception and deception. We provide a stability criterion with the help of hyper Nash equilibrium (HNE) to investigate both strategic stability and cognitive stability of equilibria in SLMF games with misinformation. In fact, we find mild stable conditions such that the equilibria with misperception and deception can become HNE. Moreover, we discuss the robustness of the equilibria to reveal whether players have the ability to keep their profits under the influence of some misinformation.

Automated summary

In this paper, a hypergame framework is used to analyze a single-leader-multiple-followers Stackelberg security game with misinformed situations. The study investigates the strategic stability and cognitive stability, and discovers mild stable conditions for the equilibria with misperception and deception to become hyper Nash equilibrium.