Argumentation, cognition, and the epistemic benefits of cognitive diversity

The social epistemology of science would benefit from paying more attention to the nature of argumentative exchanges. Argumentation is not only a cognitive activity but a collaborative social activity whose functioning needs to be understood from a psychological and communicative perspective. Thus far, social and organizational psychology has been used to discuss how social diversity affects group deliberation by changing the mindset of the participants. Argumentative exchanges have comparable effects, but they depend on cognitive diversity and emerge through critical interaction. An example of a cognitive psychological theory is discussed that explains how mutual reasoning affects how we think, make decisions, and solve problems, as well as how cognitive biases may facilitate an efficient division of cognitive labor. These observations are compared with the existing results in the social epistemology of science. Moreover, I explicate the conceptual differences between the distributed and social processing of information. While argumentative exchanges belong to the latter domain, most existing simulations model distributed processing, which may compromise their real-world relevance and proper conceptual interpretation. However, I aim not to criticize the existing simulation methods but to promote an approach from the cognitive psychology of reasoning that complements the current use of organizational psychology and computer simulations by investigating a different set of mechanisms relating to similar phenomena of interest in the social epistemology of science.

Automated summary

The social epistemology of science needs to pay more attention to the nature of argumentative exchanges, which are not only cognitive activities but also collaborative social activities. This article discusses how mutual reasoning affects thinking, decision-making, and problem-solving, and how cognitive biases facilitate the division of cognitive labor. The article emphasizes the importance of understanding the conceptual differences between distributed and social processing of information and suggests investigating different mechanisms from cognitive psychology to complement existing approaches in organizational psychology and computer simulations in the social epistemology of science.