The One China Framework at 50 (1972-2022): The Myth of Consensus and Its Evolving Policy Significance

This lead article surveys the history and evolving policy legacies of the one China framework 50 years after US President Richard Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China. It begins by introducing key concepts and highlighting the crucial difference between Beijing's self-defined one-China principle and the US's, Japan's and key other countries' variable one China policies as it relates to Taiwan. It argues that three seminal 1970s developments consolidated the one China framework as an informal institution of international politics. The ambiguity baked in by Cold War-era geopolitical necessity provided flexibility sufficient to enable diplomatic breakthroughs between erstwhile adversaries, but also planted seeds for deepening contestation and frictions today. Recent developments - especially Taiwan's democratization and Beijing's increasingly bold and proactive assertion of its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan - have transformed incentive structures in Taipei and for its major international partners. The net effect is that the myth of consensus and the ambiguities enabling the framework's half-century of success face unprecedented challenges today.

Automated summary

This lead article surveys the history and evolving policy legacies of the one China framework 50 years after US President Richard Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China. It highlights the differences between Beijing's self-defined one-China principle and the varying one China policies of the US, Japan, and other countries concerning Taiwan. The article argues that the ambiguity of the Cold War era played a role in enabling diplomatic breakthroughs but also led to ongoing contestation and friction. Recent developments, such as Taiwan's democratization and Beijing's assertiveness over sovereignty, have challenged the myth of consensus and the ambiguity that has facilitated the framework's success.