期刊
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
卷 52, 期 3, 页码 279-294出版社
CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1017/can.2020.45
关键词
Hype; science communication; values in science; trust; inductive risk
类别
Several science studies scholars have reported instances of scientific hype, which refers to exaggerated claims and sensationalized exaggeration in journal articles, institutional press releases, and science journalism across various fields. The author argues that hype should be understood as a specific form of exaggeration that undermines the goals of science communication by explicitly or implicitly exaggerating the positive aspects of science. This perspective highlights the role of value judgments in detecting and addressing the problem of hype.
Several science studies scholars report instances of scientific hype, or sensationalized exaggeration, in journal articles, institutional press releases, and science journalism in a variety of fields (e.g., Caulfield and Condit 2012). Yet, how hype is being conceived varies. I will argue that hype is best understood as a particular kind of exaggeration, one that explicitly or implicitly exaggerates various positive aspects of science in ways that undermine the goals of science communication in a particular context. This account also makes clear the ways that value judgments play a role in judgments of hype, which has implications for detecting and addressing this problem.
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