4.3 Article

LAWLESS SURVEILLANCE

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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
卷 97, 期 4, 页码 1143-1214

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NEW YORK UNIV SCHOOL LAW

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Policing agencies in the United States are engaging in mass collection of personal data without proper regulation. This article argues that there should be a regulatory scheme in place and outlines the constitutional solution to the problem of government mass data collection.
Policing agencies in the United States are engaging in mass collection of personal data, building a vast architecture of surveillance. License plate readers collect our location information. Mobile forensics data terminals suck in the contents of cell phones during traffic stops. CCTV maps our movements. Cheap storage means most of this is kept for long periods of time-sometimes into perpetuity. Artificial intelligence makes searching and mining the data a snap. For most of us whose data is collected, stored, and mined, there is no suspicion whatsoever of wrongdoing. This growing network of surveillance is almost entirely unregulated. It is, in short, lawless. The Fourth Amendment touches almost none of it, either because what is captured occurs in public, and so is supposedly knowingly exposed, or because of the doctrine that shields information collected from third parties. It is unregulated by statutes because legislative bodies-when they even know about these surveillance systems-see little profit in taking on the police. In the face of growing concern over such surveillance, this Article argues there is a constitutional solution sitting in plain view. In virtually every other instance in which personal information is collected by the government, courts require that a sound regulatory scheme be in place before information collection occurs. The rulings on the mandatory nature of regulation are remarkably similar, no matter under which clause of the Constitution collection is challenged. This Article excavates this enormous body of precedent and applies it to the problem of government mass data collection. It argues that before the government can engage in such surveillance, there must be a regulatory scheme in place. And by changing the default rule from allowing police to collect absent legislative prohibition, to banning collection until there is legislative action, legislatures will be compelled to act (or there will be no surveillance). The Article defines what a minimally acceptable regulatory scheme for mass data collection must include and shows how it can be grounded in the Constitution.

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