On the zetetic significance of peer disagreement

I present a puzzle regarding the norms of disagreement and inquiry. The puzzle mainly concerns a special type of peer disagreement that I call mild disagreement, in which the parties to the disagreement believe a proposition but with different degrees of confidence. The puzzle is best formulated as an inconsistent triad: (NJ1) The state of mild disagreement provides the involved parties with no epistemic reason to drop their belief regarding the disputed judgment. (NJ2) The state of mild disagreement provides a practical reason for the involved parties to launch an inquiry into the disputed judgment. (NJ3) If the state of disagreement provides a reason to launch an inquiry into the disputed judgment, the involved parties have a reason to drop their belief regarding the disputed judgment. After discussing some possible responses to the puzzle, I offer my own solution, which involves introducing a new take on how to understand inquiry. This new take on the nature of inquiry can provide us with an alternative to the influential account recently defended by Jane Friedman.

Automated summary

This article presents a puzzle about the norms of disagreement and inquiry, specifically focusing on a type of disagreement called mild disagreement. The author formulates the puzzle as an inconsistent triad and explores possible responses before offering their own solution, which involves a new understanding of inquiry as an alternative to a prominent account by Jane Friedman.