Why reasons and reasoning don't come apart

In recent years several philosophers have proposed what has come to be called the Reasoning View of normative reasons, according to which normative reasons are premises of sound reasoning. The reasoning view has come under some criticism, which chiefly consists in counterexamples that purport to show that something can be a premise of sound reasoning without intuitively being a normative reason, or can be a normative reason without being a premise of sound reasoning. I here consider and reject three examples that were recently put forward. Discussing them will allow me to clarify the Reasoning View in important respects.

Automated summary

In recent years, philosophers have proposed the Reasoning View of normative reasons, claiming that normative reasons are premises of sound reasoning. This view has faced criticism, mainly due to counterexamples that suggest something can be a premise of sound reasoning without being intuitively a normative reason, or can be a normative reason without being a premise of sound reasoning. In this paper, three recently proposed examples are considered and rejected, which helps to clarify the Reasoning View in important aspects.