Individual Responsibility to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions from a Kantian Deontological Perspective

As a collective action problem, climate change is best tackled by coordination. Most moral philosophers therefore agree on our individual responsibility as political citizens to help establish such coordination. There is disagreement, however, on our individual responsibilities as consumers to reduce emissions before such coordination is established. In this article I argue that from a Kantian deontological perspective we have a perfect duty to refrain from activities that we would not perform if appropriate coordination were established. Moral autonomy means that we do not need to wait for an external lawmaker to tell us what we ought to do. In practice, this means basing our decisions on a shadow price for carbon: if we would not go out for a drive on a sunny Sunday afternoon in a gas-guzzling sport utility vehicle if gas prices were twice as high, we should not do it now. Moreover, we have imperfect duties to reduce emissions by more than our perfect duties require.

Automated summary

As a collective action problem, climate change is best addressed through coordination. Most moral philosophers agree that as political citizens, we have a responsibility to help establish such coordination. However, there is disagreement on our individual responsibilities as consumers to reduce emissions before coordination is established. From a Kantian deontological perspective, we have a perfect duty to refrain from activities that we would not perform if appropriate coordination were in place.