期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY
卷 -, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2290181
关键词
Externalism; disjunctive properties; structural mismatch; colour phenomenology; perceptual experience; colour
The article discusses the relationship between externalism and the structural mismatch argument in color phenomenology. By studying hue variation, distinctions in color tones, and differences in perceived colors among individuals, the author argues that disjunctive properties can explain these phenomena. Finally, the author suggests that correlative externalism provides a better explanation for the correlation between physical properties and color experiences.
Externalism about colour phenomenology claims that the phenomenal character of colour experiences is determined by mind-independent properties of perceptual objects. The structural mismatch argument shows that physical properties of perceived mind-independent things are not similar in ways that correlate with the ways in which the phenomenal character of colour experiences are similar. Structural mismatch has thus been perceived by some to demonstrate that correlative externalism (which takes mind-independent physical properties to correlate systematically with colour phenomenology) is false. This argument is defused if there are broad physical properties that can bear similarity relations that do correlate with those held by the phenomenal character of colour experiences. I defend the view that disjunctive properties can perform this role by showing that disjunctive properties can account for metamerism, the unique and binary hue distinction, and differences in perceived colours between subjects. Finally, I argue that correlative externalism is better placed than other views to explain why the physical properties identified by the physical sciences correlate with colour experiences with the particular phenomenal character they have.
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