期刊
JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS
卷 238, 期 2, 页码 -出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2023.105566
关键词
English auctions; partial identification; maximum entropy; inequality constraints; nonparametric inference
This paper discusses how to determine the optimal reserve price in auctions using maximum entropy estimation and proposes a maxmin decision rule that includes both the maximum entropy solution and other methods.
We consider a situation in which we have data from ascending auctions with symmetric bidders, independent private values, and exogenous entry in which the bidders' value distribution is partially identified. Focusing on the case in which the seller intends to use a second price auction, we discuss how to determine an optimal reserve price. We justify the use of maximum entropy, explore the properties of the estimand, determine the asymptotic properties of our maximum entropy estimator, evaluate its behavior in a simulation study, and demonstrate its use in a modest application. As an extension, we propose a maxmin decision rule with entropy regularization, which includes Aryal and Kim (2013) and the maximum entropy solution as extreme cases.
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