What Matters for Corporate Cash Holdings Board Governance, Financial Constraints, or Interactions?

Corporate cash holdings have received increased attention from researchers and practitioners as cash management is a crucial task for executives. Holding too much cash can result in low returns and mismanagement by managers. Conversely, holding low cash reserves can lead to missed investment opportunities. The present study examines the relationship between board governance, financial constraints, and corporate cash holdings. The robust fixed-effects method is used in this study to analyze 860 A-listed firms in China from 2005 to 2020. An index is designed to measure board effectiveness, while financial constraints are measured using Z-score, the Kaplan and Zingales index, and the SA index. The major findings document that the financially less constrained firms hold more cash when there is an effective board governance. Furthermore, financially less constrained firms have more robust board governance to minimize the agency concerns of managers and shareholders. This research provides an inference for stockholders' activism connected to the cash holdings of the financially constrained and less constrained companies. The findings offer useful policy implications for stakeholders to reform contemporary cash holding policies. Specifically, understanding the role of an effective governance system for financially less constrained firms would help minimize the potential agency conflict.JEL Classification: G34, O16, G32, F34

Automated summary

This study examines the relationship between board governance, financial constraints, and corporate cash holdings and finds that financially less constrained firms hold more cash when there is effective board governance. These findings offer useful policy implications for reforming contemporary cash holding policies.