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Epistemology as Pragmatic Inquiry: Rorty, Haack, and Academic Relativism in Education

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SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11217-023-09909-0

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Philosophy of education; Pragmatism; Susan Haack; Richard Rorty; Relativism; Democracy; Epistemology

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This article discusses the controversy surrounding truth in the current era of fake news and misinformation. The author examines the epistemic commitments of foundationalism and coherentism, as well as the potential intersections between the two through pragmatism. The goal of the paper is to clarify the role of truth and facts in cognitive thinking and to highlight the untenable position of relativism in education.
In a post-Trump, post-Covid-19 world, it is clear that truth is contested by fake news outlets and misinformation. Less clear is how to navigate the vicissitudes of intersectional discourse without devolving into a Richard Rortyan relativism that denies truth altogether. This paper considers the epistemic commitments of foundationalism and coherentism before turning to pragmatist Susan Haack to explore whether there are convergences between the two. The goal of this paper is three-fold: (1) to clarify how truth and fact feature in foundationalist and coherentist epistemic thinking; (2) to offer a pragmatist foundherentist intersection between foundationalism and coherentism; and (3) to use (1) and (2) to highlight the untenable position Rortyan relativism represents, specifically in relation to education formally understood.

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