Not thinking about the same thing. Enactivism, pragmatism and intentionality

Enactivism does not have its primary philosophical roots in pragmatism: phenomenology (from Husserl to Jonas) is its first source of inspiration (with the exception of Hutto & Myin's radical enactivism). That does not exclude the benefits of pragmatist readings of enactivism, and of enactivist readings of pragmatism. After having sketched those readings, this paper focuses on the philosophical concept of intentionality. I show that whereas enactivists endorse the idea that intentionality is a base-level property of cognition, pragmatism offer(ed) us some reasons not to proceed this way. It is therefore doubtful to hold that pragmatists and enactivists would converge in the defence of a common, non-representational conception of intentionality.

Automated summary

Enactivism's primary philosophical roots are in phenomenology, not pragmatism. However, there can still be benefits from interpreting enactivism through a pragmatist lens and vice versa. This paper focuses on the concept of intentionality and examines how enactivists and pragmatists differ in their views. It questions whether they can converge on a shared, non-representational conception of intentionality.