期刊
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
卷 -, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13042
关键词
certainty; epistemic decision theory; fallibilism; inquiry; knowledge
类别
The goal of inquiry is to find answers to questions, but it does not require absolute certainty. An alternative view suggests that the aim of inquiry is to maximize the epistemic value of our beliefs, which aligns with epistemic decision theory. This alternative view has significant implications for important topics in epistemology.
Why engage in inquiry? According to many philosophers, the goal of inquiring into some question is to come to know its answer. While this view holds considerable appeal, this paper argues that it stands in tension with another highly attractive thesis: knowledge does not require absolute certainty. Forced to choose between these two theses, I argue that we should reject the idea that inquiry aims at knowledge. I go on to develop an alternative view, according to which inquiry aims at maximizing the epistemic value of our credences. This alternative view makes room for knowledge that falls shy of certainty, and it coheres nicely with a rich body of work in epistemic decision theory. I proceed to highlight the implications of this replacement for some important topics in epistemology, including the dogmatism paradox, the nature of interrogative attitudes, and the norm of practical reasoning.
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