Crude Realities: Oil, Corruption, and Anti-corruption campaigns

The past decade witnessed a surge in anti-corruption activities in post-Soviet oil-dependent countries. Despite the scale of the anti-corruption measures, and their political implications, the extant literature paid limited attention to the comparison of these campaigns, including differences in their motivations, functions, objectives, and targets. Aiming to fill this research gap, this study employs a mixed-methods research design that combines fixed-effects panel data analysis with a paired-case qualitative analysis of Russia and Kazakhstan. I argue that anti-corruption policies are the result of either economic necessity or the desire to secure power through buttressing regime legitimacy. Consequently, a significant drop in oil price due to the COVID-19 crisis is likely to result in a major anti-corruption campaign targeting high-level officials in oil-rich countries.

Automated summary

The past decade has seen a surge in anti-corruption activities in post-Soviet oil-dependent countries. However, the existing literature has paid limited attention to comparing these campaigns. In this study, a mixed-methods research design is used to analyze Russia and Kazakhstan, combining fixed-effects panel data analysis with paired-case qualitative analysis. The study finds that anti-corruption policies are driven by either economic necessity or the desire to secure power and regime legitimacy. Consequently, the COVID-19 crisis and drop in oil prices are likely to lead to major anti-corruption campaigns targeting high-level officials in oil-rich countries.