Power Control Game Between a Distributed Radar Network and a Smart Jammer

In this article, the game theoretic power control for a distributed radar network in the presence of a smart jammer is investigated. The main objective of the radar network is to minimize its total transmit power while maintaining desirable estimation rates, taking into account the available power of each radar. The jammer, on the other hand, aims at maximizing the damaging effect on the radar system. By formulating the adversarial interaction between the radar system and the jammer as a Nash game and a Stackelberg game, respectively, we compute the optimal power allocation strategies for the radar system incorporating the effect of signal-dependent interference. We begin by studying a radar network where each radar can benefit from the other radars' transmission. The conditions for the existence of the Nash equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium are examined, and algorithms to obtain the optimal transmission strategies for the radar system are developed. Next, we extend the equilibrium analyses to a more general distributed radar network with inter-radar interference. Finally, numerical results are presented to confirm the theoretical analysis.

Automated summary

This article investigates the game theoretic power control for a distributed radar network in the presence of a smart jammer. The main objective is to minimize the total transmit power of the radar network while maintaining desirable estimation rates, considering the available power of each radar. The interactions between the radar system and the jammer are formulated as a Nash game and a Stackelberg game, respectively, and the optimal power allocation strategies for the radar system are computed, taking into account the effect of signal-dependent interference.