The symmetry regained

attempts to break the symmetry between the modal ontological argument for the existence of God and the reverse modal ontological argument against the existence of God by drawing on some Kripkean lessons about a posteriori necessity. He argues that there is an undercutting defeater for taking God's non-existence to be possible. In this paper, I reply that taking the Kripkean considerations about a posteriori necessity into account does not help break the symmetry. For we can argue in a similar way that there is an undercutting defeater for taking God's existence to be possible.

Automated summary

This paper examines the attempt to break the symmetry between the modal ontological argument for the existence of God and the reverse modal ontological argument against the existence of God. The author argues that considering Kripke's insights on a posteriori necessity does not help achieve this goal, as a similar argument can also be made for the possibility of God's existence.