期刊
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
卷 -, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC
DOI: 10.1177/00220027231220021
关键词
political leadership; international security; arms transfers; status; authoritarian leader
This study examines the motivations behind arms imports by states, finding that states with higher levels of negative status inconsistency tend to import more status symbol weapons, particularly non-democratic personalist regimes.
Major weapon system imports are significant as they are useful for domestic and international security. However, states regularly imported weapons they want in addition to weapons they need. One explanation is that states import unnecessary weapons to gain status. We argue that states suffering from higher levels of negative status inconsistency (SI) import a greater proportion of status symbol weapons. To account for differing security motives, we also separate non-democratic regime types - strongman, junta, boss, and machine - as they vary in their international conflict propensity and domestic stability. Due to the differences across these regimes, we further argue that non-democratic personalist regimes will import more status symbol weapons. Using data covering 1965-1999, we find that negatively status inconsistent regimes import more status symbol weapons.
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